



Puente Democrático

Documents

Year V Number 17 - July 18, 2007

Rogue States: A Timely Concept and Its Application to Latin America

Rogue states are perhaps new as a term in international politics, but they are not a novelty *per se*. They have existed throughout the different periods of history, generally displaying the same characteristics: The system of government is dictatorial and tend more towards totalitarianism than towards authoritarianism; their rhetoric and foreign policy are fervently anti-American; unlike other dictatorships, they are obsessed with international politics; they are constant practitioners of melodrama and expert users of propaganda. At the beginning of the last century, the world's premier rogue state was the German Empire, the Second Reich. The Second World War was the necessary conflict to eliminate the totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy, but perhaps it is Japan that most resembled a rogue state. There were numerous rogue states during the Cold War, which brings us to Latin America. Cuba's communist regime clearly had a rogue phase. Today's world shares a trait with 1914: it is quite favorable to the emergence of rogue states. The most powerful of them all is Russia. Another regime that presently constitutes a rogue state is Communist Korea and the third and most dangerous is Iran. Latin America has its own rogue state to deal with, and it could not be worse positioned to do so. It is Hugo Chávez's Venezuela.

By Pablo Brum



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Political discourse in the English language has a term for which there is no equivalent in Spanish: *rogue state*. The most accurate translation could be *Estado rebelde*, but it fails to fully convey the idea of a rogue state. Rogue states are so called because they are regimes involved in active efforts at rebelling against the *international system*. That latter concept refers not to a set of treaties and international organizations, but, as the Anglo-Saxon tradition suggests, a diffuse set of rules and codes of conduct widely accepted as normative, without being necessarily codified. In other words, what constitutes a rogue state is not necessarily its violation of international law, but its disruptive behavior against the system as it is conceived by the majority of democratic states. The establishment of this concept is of particular interest to Americans, because said “rebellion” usually manifests itself as a profound enmity towards their country, the largest manager and exponent of that system.

In Further Detail: Diagnosis of a Rogue State

Rogue states are perhaps new as a term in international politics, but they are not a novelty *per se*. They have existed throughout the different periods of history, generally displaying the same characteristics. How might the defining traits of a rogue state be more accurately defined? Here are some indicators:

- The system of government is dictatorial. Liberal democracies adhere effortlessly to the international system. They associate freely with others, they refrain from starting unprovoked wars, they do not practice nationalism or expansionism, they are open to trade, they comply with their legal obligations and in general display *good behavior*. The essence of dictatorships is that they are outlaw regimes, completely lacking in legitimacy. For someone who grabs power in their own country through illegal actions, the rules of the international system will matter little to nothing. The only guiding principle in their foreign policies are a cost-benefit calculus, much like in the domestic arena. Therefore, a dictatorial government is a precondition for a state to become a rogue state.
- Rogue states tend more towards totalitarianism than towards authoritarianism. Usually, it is a process that accelerates dramatically a few years after the regime takes power. It begins with a bipolar posture: assurances to the international community and the local opposition that pacific coexistence will be maintained, coupled with simultaneous rallying cries to its bases in which what will happen a few years down the road is unmistakably announced. The incidents that accelerate the regime’s consolidation are repeated in several cases. The government eliminates freedom of expression, mostly by shutting down private media outlets. The right to associate freely is also abolished: first by cracking down on non-governmental organizations and others the regime might find hostile; afterwards with small political parties—many times co-opted- and finally with the largest opposition movements. The State also inverts its role as the guarantor of private property. It employs expropriations, the creation of excessive taxes and controls over the economy and other measures in order to direct it. The regime also organizes public acts of intimidation against anyone who would express their opposition. Sometimes dissidents are assassinated. Others, society is militarized through the inception of “revolutionary” militia cells or the expansion and constant glorification of the Armed Forces. Often, a police state takes form, and constant denunciations of international conspiracies serve as context for the State’s being “forced” to act in that manner. One of the final measures undertaken by rogue states, because it generates more international scrutiny than any other, is the intrusion in the electoral process. It occurs through several mechanisms: interference over electoral commissions, the intimidation and banning of parties and legislators, the degrading of the Legislative Branch and local governments; black lists and prohibitions on public rallies—both in the streets and in the media- by the opposition. By the time the international community manages to complain about or even condemn what happened, it is too late. The regime is comfortably settled on the seat of power.
- The rhetoric and the foreign policy of a rogue state are fervently anti-American. The primary reason is that the United States is often opposed to the emergence of this kind of dictatorship. The others are well known. The US is the world’s superpower; it’s a country widely hated and a preferred target in irrational and nationalist arguments that circulate in the polity of many countries. It is common to blame the US for the nation’s ills; both the values it embodies and defends—liberty, democracy, capitalism- and as a specific country. Additionally, given that in dictatorial regimes the government’s will depends on a single man’s, there is generally a desire for revenge or a personal hatred on the part of the Great Leader towards the United States.
- Rogue states, unlike other dictatorships, are obsessed with international politics. A great deal of their leaders’ energies is dedicated to international *fora*, the building of alliances, denunciations of the US and other rival countries, or the upgrading of their Armed Forces. Rogue states are particularly attentive to the conduct of their immediate neighbors: either for historical reasons or for immediate power struggles, they have very specific interests in their behaving in a certain way.

- The governments of rogue states are constant practitioners of melodrama. Given that they are dictatorial regimes, many times of the messianic variety, involved in weaving narratives and histories of the country as they rule, rogue states are very interested in hogging the front pages of newspapers, and in being the center of discussion, admiration and fear. Sometimes they undertake “positive” actions, such as declaring strategic alliances with other authoritarian governments, or deploying grandiose domestic policies –such as expropriations. Other times they undertake “negative” actions, such as decrying their enemies in front of the international press, or by publishing conspiracy theories directed against entire countries. The permanent factor is that rogue states are expert users of propaganda. It is critical that there is a *script*, a villain, a hero, an oppressed people besieged by foreign enemies, a historically unresolved claim and other elements that are repeated time and again, rogue state after rogue state. The screenplay is usually the same, although each regime and leader adds their own style to the actual performance.
- Rogue states are also distinguished for introducing a foreign policy term that is alien to democratic governments: the constant demands of “respect”. This must not be confused with, say, a free nation demanding its borders be “respected”, which is normal and legitimate. Rogue states, however, make grandiose demands for respect from the international community, generally in a vague way directed towards its great enemies and angled for internal consumption. The type of respect that they demand varies according to the size and the aggressiveness of the rogue state. Usually it’s about the country being respected as a “great nation”, by having its historical importance recognized, by having its “right to sovereignty” guaranteed in the face of international denunciations about what’s going on in the country and in general calling for others to “respect” their right to act as they please. The most audacious ones complain about the need for others to respect their “historical role” as regional or even world leaders.
- Finally, rogue states embark on international campaigns of conquest and disruption, which inevitably begin with the humiliation of their immediate neighbors. This kind of regime usually considers their own arrival as regional hegemony as a delayed historical inevitability. They seek small, weak states, with little military capacity, moderate ties to the United States and with which they have historical disputes to settle. The intervention on the neighbors’ affairs is always blamed on the victim, either because it does not “respect” the perpetrator or because

it collaborates with a conspiracy to “surround” it, or perhaps to settle those historical disputes.

Their Effects on International Politics

The emergence of a rogue state is a catastrophic event. It is extremely difficult –nigh impossible- to contain it and have it deflate without it clashing with others and causing severe damage in its vicinity. The aggressive nature of these regimes makes violence their objective and primary method, while the honest nature of liberal democracies makes them ideal victims.

A brief historical analysis shows that the appearance of rogue states has provoked wars, genocides, conquests, annexations and other kinds of calamities. It is necessary to go back in time to understand that a rogue state is not just a theoretical conjecture nor one more trait of the international system, but a *constant, underlying threat*, comparable to a time bomb.

At the beginning of the last century, the world’s premier rogue state was the German Empire – the Second Reich. Its government was authoritarian in nature. Its *Kaiser’s* obsession with foreign affairs, his hatred –for many reasons- of countries such as Belgium, France or Russia, his intolerance of liberal democracy, his penchant for foreign policy theatrics with his travels and statements and his constant demands of “respect” towards Germany.

The Europe of that time failed or did not really want to contain Germany. It chose to form weak alliances and wait until Germany had decided to start a war that cost twenty million lives.¹ Since then, practically every rogue state has displayed strikingly similar characteristics.

The Second World War was the necessary conflict to eliminate the totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy, but perhaps it is Japan that most resembled a rogue state. While National Socialist Germany prepared for war, with clear objectives, ever since Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, the Japanese imperial regime showed itself to be much more erratic, a notorious manifestation of rogue state behavior. While Germany’s objective was to fight a genocidal holy war of sorts against Jews and communism, Japan’s was to kick the international playing board and send the chips flying –at last, gaining the “respect” it deserved as a great power.²

It was done in 1941 with the attack on Pearl Harbor; the consequences are well known. Only a *double nuclear strike* made Tokyo’s imperial-militarist regime surrender.

There were numerous rogue states during the Cold War, which brings us to Latin America. Cuba’s communist regime clearly had a rogue phase, initiated just a few years after its totalitarian dictatorship was consolidated. Fidel Castro’s government scrambled to participate in every activity typical of this regime. He made histrionic displays in front of the cameras every time he had the chance and wherever he was

received. He became obsessed with the United States, while transforming an old Latin American grudge into a no-holds-barred ideological war, which included a nuclear confrontation and his intention to exchange missiles with the enemy. He bullied neighbors such as Granada or Nicaragua. Castro acted beyond the physical possibilities of his country, with bloody interventions in Ethiopia and Angola.³ His defiance towards the international system was only dimmed when the Cold War ended and his generous Soviet subsidies vaporized. The Great Leader's transition to senility was not enough: even at the doorstep of death, he keeps his hatred and combative spirit alive.⁴

Today's world shares a trait with 1914: it is quite favorable to the emergence of rogue states. The present system, unipolar with multipolar tendencies, is more fertile to the appearance of states not under the cape of one of two sides that exist in a bipolar world. The superpower's attention can't be everywhere simultaneously, since its resources are limited. Therefore, a combination of historical inheritances⁵ with new economic tendencies⁶ incentivizes the creation of regimes highly dangerous for democracy and international security.

The most powerful of them all is Russia. The autocrat Vladimir Putin could teach whole courses or write the book on how to found and expand a rogue state. He has followed the script to perfection, with the expected results. Russia demands the "respect" of the United States.⁷ It bullies neighbors such as Estonia⁸, Ukraine⁹ or Georgia¹⁰ day after day. It assassinates strategic dissidents to make sure there are not even attempts at expressing opposition – much like Aleksandr Litvinenko¹¹, Anna Politkovskaya¹² and others found out. Those who do organize to oppose the regime can only expect repression and obstruction in the streets, as is the case with the persecution of Garry Kasparov.¹³ Putin is one of the least theatrical leaders of a rogue state, but nonetheless he can't help but put out hostile declarations against the US¹⁴ and Europe¹⁵, knowing that his control over the gas and petroleum¹⁶ valves forces his victim to listen – and fear – him.

Another regime that presently constitutes a rogue state is Communist Korea. Unlike the others, this is a government established half a century ago, and which hasn't moved a bit from its squarely totalitarian design.¹⁷ The Koreans are perhaps the ones that most speak of "respect".¹⁸ Their conduct is exemplary of what a rogue state does: missile tests¹⁹, nuclear programs and proliferation²⁰, kidnappings²¹, drug trafficking, sales of food donated by the international community, terrorist attacks, grandiose declarations, threats of genocide.²² Communist Korea's unfortunate neighbors don't have a more dangerous rival. The strategy they have adopted is appeasement and negotiation.²³

A third rogue state is Iran. It is also the most dangerous of them all. Iran has made a sport out of scandal and international

demand-ism. The great Persian nation demands "respect" in every international forum it attends. It practices repression based on *Shari'a* law.²⁴

Just like Korea, it seeks nuclear weapons²⁵, it is confronted to the United States and it intends to stomp over its neighbors.²⁶ Iran's case is particularly worrying because, unlike Russia or Korea, it has a religious²⁷ and a genocidal fantasy²⁸ component, which perhaps approximates it more to the Third Reich than to the second; more to Hitler than to the Kaiser. The damage Iran has caused internationally due to its terrorist actions is well known: against the United States in Saudi Arabia, against Israel in Lebanon²⁹, against Iraq and the United Kingdom in the present war.³⁰ As a matter of fact, the terrorist attacks Iran executed in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 against Judeo-Israeli targets³¹ – which have never been answered – make Iran the most dangerous rogue state to Latin America.

It is not because for the first time in decades the region has its own rogue state to deal with, and it could not be worse positioned to do so. It is Hugo Chávez's dictatorship in Venezuela.

Venezuela: Latin America's Dormant Crisis

Hugo Chávez easily takes home the award for international melodrama, even more than Fidel Castro. His appearances on *Aló Presidente*³² were only a preview of what would come. His appearances in Cuba, in international "Social Forums", in Pan-American summits³³ and in the United Nations top even the *Kaiser* himself.³⁴

Two things are known with certainty about Chávez. Firstly, his objective is to establish a socialist dictatorship in Venezuela. Those who point out the fact that political parties³⁵, media outlets, private companies and dissidents survive in Venezuela fool themselves into believing those are signs of Chávez being a man on a mission.³⁶ It must be recalled that as all dictators, the President of Venezuela operates based on convenience and momentary strategy³⁷, not on moral or democratic considerations. The same mistake has been made in regard to uncountable despots throughout history: underestimating their intentions³⁸, assuming they do not believe in their own ideology other than as a vehicle to gain power, trusting their rationality.³⁹ It would be absurd to think Chávez is any different, particularly because he is one of those that, like Lenin or Hitler, have taken the time to specify that Venezuela is heading towards "socialism"⁴⁰ and that party-based democracy isn't good enough for him.⁴¹

The second thing that is known with certainty about Chávez is that, predictably, he hates the United States.⁴² This is a favorite subject of whom Carlos Montaner called *el papagayo de Caracas*. Chávez's current strategy is to direct all his rhetoric artillery against the US, but none of his real weapons. Instead, Chávez works hard in the construction of a regional bloc⁴³ with Miraflores as its nucleus.⁴⁴ Witness

his constant trips to Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia, his current satellite-states,⁴⁵ even to inhospitable regions to which he does not need to travel and at times where he has more pressing concerns at home. It is evident that *Chávez is obsessed with foreign policy*, as is also demonstrated by his open intervention in elections in Nicaragua, Ecuador, Perú⁴⁶, Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay.

There are two more signs of a rogue state to diagnose in Venezuela. The first one is the obsession with “respect”. There are two reasons why this demand is not observed so clearly in Venezuela. First, there are no previous instances of lack of “respect” –usually imaginary- that states like Russia, Iran or Communist Korea can proclaim. Latin America has been a peaceful neighborhood; Venezuela hasn’t fought severely with any neighbors in recent times. The second reason is that Chávez prefers to channel everything he says and does internationally in opposition to the United States. Therefore, he is less interested in others “respecting” him as he is in them hating and opposing that country. Chávez is perhaps the leader who has most *personalized* this hatred⁴⁷, even more than Fidel Castro.⁴⁸ It has not stopped him from demanding “respect” from the US after the Bush Administration’s support for his removal from power in 2002. The final trait of a rogue state that needs to be considered in Venezuela is also the most problematical: his behavior towards his neighbors. Fortunately, one of them is Brazil. It’s too big a country for Venezuela to dare to intimidate or provoke⁴⁹ –even though Evo Morales’ conduct in Bolivia, a country much less powerful than Venezuela, serves as an alert to the opposing viewpoint.⁵⁰ Additionally, Brazil has always been a pacifist left-leaning state, topped off presently with a leftist government which is allied with Venezuela in many issues.⁵¹ All of that is a relief to Brazil, but it is unfortunate for Venezuela’s other neighbor, Colombia – which is condemned to being the escape valve of the Bolivarian pandemonium.⁵²

President Álvaro Uribe has cultivated Chávez, knowing that he can ruin his careful efforts at pacifying his country and freeing it from terrorism. However, it’s a dynamic that is doomed not to last. The present scenario includes all the reasons why Venezuela might be interested in showing aggression towards Colombia, in one way or another. In the first place, there is currently a powerful communist guerrilla in that country that has been fighting its democratic governments for decades. It must be expected that a communist, *golpista* and violent man like Chávez would consider the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* as his acolytes.⁵³ It is a strategy similar to the one Cuba has deployed, particularly *vis-à-vis* the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*. Secondly, the border between both countries is porous and inviting to smugglers, drug trafficking, gunrunning and other illegal activities. Thirdly, Colombia is the United States’ largest ally in Latin America; the US grants

it billions of dollars in aid every year. Finally, there is another reason that hovers above the others: Chávez is a dictator, and dictators don’t need reasons.

This is not just a hypothetical scenario: it’s happening right now.⁵⁴ The connections between Venezuela and the FARC⁵⁵, through the deliveries of weapons and ammo⁵⁶ or the enabling of drug trafficking⁵⁷, are already documented.⁵⁸ Beyond Colombia, Venezuela behaves as an exemplary rogue state. Its alliance with Iran⁵⁹ threatens, in one possible scenario, to transform Latin America into another launch platform for nuclear-tipped missiles towards the United States by totalitarian regimes.⁶⁰ It has already been verified, for example, that Venezuela goes through the trouble of providing passports to citizens of “Middle Eastern origin”.⁶¹ What is Chávez up to?⁶² Does his alliance to Iran respond uniquely to a daring attempt at assembling a world-class *bad boys gang*, of enemies of the United States allied in a common front? Or is there a common desire of subscribing, even if not publicly, to a mutual defense agreement?

Both countries could benefit from such a pact. If the United States attacks Iran, Venezuela could respond with petroleum-related actions⁶³, by allowing the use of Iranian missiles deployed in Venezuela, or by facilitating terrorist activities in the US or Latin America with Venezuelan passports. If it is Venezuela that feels assaulted, Iran could cause even more trouble for the United States in the Middle East, perhaps ordering *Hizb Allah* to start another war in Lebanon or escalating its terrorist operations in Iraq.

These are only hypothetical scenarios, of which infinite variants could be drawn. The unifying factor is this: *the current situation bodes nothing good for Latin America*.⁶⁴ Venezuela is in a collision course with the United States and the international system in general.⁶⁵ Even if Latin American countries stay away from it –which they have not done enough-⁶⁶ it is inevitable that they will be grouped with Venezuela, with all that implies.⁶⁷

The only remaining thing that can be done is minimizing the damage. It is important that Latin American countries do the opposite of what they are presently doing.⁶⁸ Liberal democracy must be revalued. They must encourage alliances between themselves and with the United States.⁶⁹ They must oppose Venezuela in all international fora and turn it into a *new pariah*, similar to Cuba. It must be expelled from international organizations such as the Organization of American States or the Latin American Integration Association. It is critical that there is as much interference as possible in the Venezuela – Iran alliance, which regrettably already has its own gravitas.⁷⁰ In any case, the democracies of Latin America must not separate themselves from Venezuela *only* because they don’t want to be seen with the neighborhood rogue state, so that when it collapses they cannot be blamed for their tolerance of that dictatorship. *They must do it because it is the right thing*, and because

for the first time in a long while many of the factors that make for a dangerous security situation are assembling in the region.

Latin America suffers from poverty, lousy economic policies hostile to liberty and property, a depreciation of liberal

democracy and an unjustified hostility towards the United States. The last thing it needs is something that has been avoided for decades, the only thing that separates it from regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa or certain parts of Asia: a serious, unchecked international security problem.

Notas:

¹ The countries that would become the Allies of the Great War knew many years beforehand that their irreconcilable differences with Germany's foreign policy would lead to war. However, even in 1914 the United Kingdom's participation was in doubt, which encouraged Germany to spark a mass scale war. *The Guns of August*, Barbara Tuchman, Ballantine, 1962

² *A History of Modern Times*, Paul Johnson, 1988

³ Castro even institutionalized antiliberal terrorism in gatherings and training sessions in his capital. His volatility managed to upset even his benefactors in the Soviet Union. *The World Was Going Our Way*, Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, Basic Books, 2005

⁴ "Capitalism intends to practice massive euthanasia against the poor, particularly the South's, because it is there where the planet's largest reserves of biomass, required to produce biofuels, are located". *Se Intensifica El Debate*, Fidel Castro, Granma, May 9th 2007

⁵ Cold War wounds, inherited regimes, past humiliations, nationalisms

⁶ The growing importance of energy resources in public policy and the way governments take over them; the spreading of information technologies, to name only two

⁷ *Putin Suspends Treaty In Response To U.S. Plan*, Peter Finn, The Washington Post, April 26th 2007

⁸ *Estonia Hit By 'Moscow Cyber War'*, BBC News, May 17th 2007

⁹ *La 'Paranoïa Orange' Du Kremlin*, Marie Jégo, Le Monde, February 3rd 2006

¹⁰ *Georgians Blame 'GasPutin' For Crisis*, Natalia Antelava, BBC News, January 24th 2006

¹¹ *London Riddle: A Russian Spy, A Lethal Dose*, Alan Cowell, The New York Times, November 25th 2006

¹² *Russians Remember Killed Reporter*, BBC News, October 8th 2006

¹³ *Kasparov, Building Opposition To Putin*, Steven Lee Myers, The New York Times, March 10th 2007

¹⁴ *Putin Attacks 'Very Dangerous' US*, BBC News, February 10th 2007

¹⁵ *Putin Criticises West Over Energy*, BBC News, April 27th 2006

¹⁶ *Russia 'Forced' Into Oil Shutdown*, BBC News, January 9th 2007

¹⁷ *Under The Loving Care of The Fatherly Leader*, Bradley Martin, St. Martin's Press, 2004

¹⁸ *N. Korea Wants U.S. To End 'Hostile Attitude'*, Anthony Faiola, The Washington Post,

¹⁹ *Outcry Over N Korea Missile Test*, BBC News, July 5th 2006

²⁰ *N Korea Helping Iran With Nuclear Testing*, Con Coughlin, The Telegraph, January 24th 2007

²¹ *Man Says DPRK Brainwashed Sister*, Yomiuri Shimbun, May 2nd 2007

²² *North Korea Threatens 'Sea of Fire' If Attacked*, BBC News, January 22nd 1999

²³ *Seoul Opts Out of N. Korea Sanctions*, Chosunilbo, November 13th 2006

Russia and China Resist Korea Penalty, The New York Times, July 7th 2006

²⁴ Arabic name for Islamic law, derived from the *Qu'ran* and the teachings of Mohammed. Some examples of its present-day application: *Iran Town Rejoices At Public Hanging*, Natalia Antelava, BBC News, March 16th 2005

Iran Exonerates Six Who Killed In Islam's Name, Nazila Fathi, The New York Times, April 19th 2007

Crackdown In Iran Over Dress Codes, Frances Harrison, BBC News, April 27th 2007

²⁵ *Iran Refuses To Stop Nuclear Work*, BBC News, March 8th 2006

²⁶ *Iran Poised To Strike In Wealthy Gulf States*, Colin Freeman, The Telegraph, March 5th 2007

²⁷ *'Divine Mission' Driving Iran's New Leader*, Anton La Guardia, The Telegraph, January 14th 2006

²⁸ *Iranian President Ahmadinejad: Israel Will Soon Be 'Wiped Out'*, Ha'aretz, December 12th 2006

²⁹ *In Iran's Streets, Aid To Hezbollah Stirs Resentment*, Michael Slackman, The New York Times, July 23rd 2006

³⁰ *Iranian Reveals Plans To Expand Role In Iraq*, James Glanz, The New York Times, January 29th 2007

³¹ *Argentina Pursues Iran In '94 Blast As Neighbors Court Ahmadinejad*, Monte Reel, The Washington Post, January 14th 2007

³² "If some day you come up with the idea of invading Venezuela, we'll be waiting for you. Come on here Mr. Danger. Coward, murderer, genocide. You're a genocidal, you're an alcoholic, you are a drunkard Mr. Danger. You are immoral". *Aló Presidente*, Hugo Chávez, March 19th 2006

³³ *Duras Acusaciones de Morales y Chávez En La Cumbre de Iguazú*, La Nación, May 4th 2006

³⁴ "(...) the first citizens who should read this book are the citizen brothers and sisters of the United States, because the threat is in their own home, the Devil is at home. The Devil, the Devil himself is at home. The Devil came here yesterday (...) to this very spot. It still smells of sulphur in this lectern where it is my turn to speak. Yesterday, ladies, gentlemen, from this very pulpit, the President of the United States, whom I call "the Devil" came here speaking as if he owned the world. A psychiatrist would not be out of place in analyzing yesterday's speech by the President of the United States. He came here as the spokesman of imperialism, to hand out his recipes, in trying to uphold the current scheme of domination, exploitation and looting of the peoples of the world. It would be proper for an Alfred Hitchcock movie, I would even title it "The Devil's Recipes". North-american imperialism, and Chomsky says it here with a meridian and deep clarity, is desperate in its efforts to consolidate its hegemonic system of domination. We cannot allow this to happen, we cannot allow a world dictatorship to be imposed, to be consolidated this world dictatorship. The speech of the world tyrant President, packed with cynicism, filled with hypocrisy, it's imperial hypocrisy, the attempt to control everything, they want to impose

on us the democratic model as they conceive it, the fake democracy of elites, and also, a very original democratic model: imposed through bombings, bombardments and at the tip of invasions and cannon rounds. Some democracy! The thesis of Aristhoteles and the first to speak over there in Greece about democracy would have to be reviewed, to find out which model of democracy this is, the one imposed at the tip of Marines, invasions, aggressions and bombs”.

Chávez, *El Diablo y la ONU*, Carlos Montaner, September 25th 2006

³⁵ *Un Proceso Electoral Incierto*, Andrés Oppenheimer, *El Nuevo Herald*, June 15th 2006

³⁶ *Chávez's Economic Plans Set Latin American Markets Reeling*, Juan Forero, *The Washington Post*, January 10th 2007

³⁷ *Venezuela Poised To Hand Chávez Wide-Ranging Powers*, Juan Forero, *The Washington Post*, January 31st 2007

³⁸ *Spain Sold €540.000 Worth of Chemical Warfare Agents To Venezuela*, Europa Press, April 7th 2005

³⁹ *Venezuela Assumes Control of Its Oil Fields*, Juan Forero, *The Washington Post*, May 1st 2007

⁴⁰ *Chávez Inició Su Tercer Mandato Con Una Férrea Defensa del Socialismo*, *La Nación*, January 10th 2007

⁴¹ *Chávez Would Abolish Presidential Term Limit*, Juan Forero, *The Washington Post*, January 11th 2007

⁴² *Chávez Stokes Confrontation Over U.S. Role In Venezuela*, Monte Reel, *The Washington Post*, July 19th 2005

⁴³ *Seeking United Latin America, Venezuela's Chávez Is A Divider*, Juan Forero, *The Washington Post*, May 20th 2006

⁴⁴ “Recently, Hugo Chavez has stated that Venezuela is entering the “third phase” of the revolution. To most, this language might seem somewhat harmless; however, it was Fidel Castro, half a century ago, who used these same words before he informed his Soviet counterparts of his intention to incite revolution throughout Latin America. Chavez is communicating his plans for the future to the Socialist and Communist elements in Latin America. He plans to unite Latin America to counterbalance U.S. hegemony to fulfill the aspirations of Marti, Bolivar, and Castro.” [Nuance In Chávez's Rhetoric Tells of Future Plans For Region, Helle Dale, The Heritage Foundation, 15 de febrero de 2007](#)

⁴⁵ Not to mention Venezuela and Chávez's role in the birth of some of those satellite-governments

⁴⁶ *García's Win In Perú Is A Loss For Chávez*, Monte Reel, *The Washington Post*, June 6th 2006

⁴⁷ With his constant references to the President of the United States

⁴⁸ *Castro, Chávez y El Odio Al Imperio*, Mariano Grondona, *La Nación*, August 6th 2006

⁴⁹ *Lula Advierte A Chávez Que Cuide La Democracia*, *La Nación*, January 29th 2007

⁵⁰ Meaning, the expropriation or statization of *Petróleos Brasileiros (Petrobras)*'s assets in Bolivia. Even after an unusually tough Brazilian response, the bolivian government did not retract.

⁵¹ Nonetheless, Brazilian-Venezuelan relations are collapsing at great speed: “Chávez caused indignation among Brazilian authorities when he qualified, last night in a national broadcast, the Brazilian Senate as the ‘parrot that repeats everything the United States says’; the Senators ‘the empire’s pawns’ and the latin-american elites in general ‘oligarchs’. It was a reaction to a request by Brazil’s Senate for the leader to reconsider the non-renewal of RCTV’s licence, a measure strongly contested around the world”. According to what the press reports, Brazilian legislators of a plurality of parties are expressing more and more condemnation of Chávez. The President, on the other hand, would opine the same but is more reluctant and cautious in his treatment of Chávez. *Tensión Diplomática Entre Brasil y Venezuela*, Luis Esnal, *La Nación*, June 2nd 2007

⁵² *Venezuela Aims For Biggest Military Reserve In Americas*, Greg Morsbach, *The Guardian*, March 4th 2006

⁵³ The lack of cooperation on the part of Venezuela in the pursuit of FARC agents –unlike with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia– moved Colombia’s government to execute a daring capture operation in that country, to render Rodrigo Granda, a high-ranking member of the FARC, to Colombia. That incident caused a major diplomatic crisis between both countries, which was finally solved.

⁵⁴ “FARC and ELN units often crossed into Venezuelan territory for rest and re-supply, with little concern that they would be pursued by Venezuelan forces.” [Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview, U.S. Department of State, 28 de abril de 2006](#)

⁵⁵ “(...) Colombia’s three US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (...) continued to regard Venezuelan territory near the border as a safe area to conduct crossborder incursions, transship arms and drugs, rest and secure logistical supplies, as well as to commit kidnappings and extortion for profit. Weapons and ammunitions –some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities– continued flowing from Venezuelan suppliers and intermediaries into the hands of Colombia’s FTOs. It is unclear to what extent and at what level the Venezuelan Government approves of or condones material support for Colombian terrorists.” [Country Reports On Terrorism: Venezuela, Embassy of the United States in Caracas, Venezuela, 27 de abril de 2005](#)

⁵⁶ “Although it is unclear how they were obtained, some weapons seized from Colombian narco-terrorists have come from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities. (...) While it remains unclear to what extent the Government of Venezuela provides material support to Colombian terrorists, it is difficult to believe that the Chavez government is unaware of, or helpless to prevent such activity. Over the past year we have seen published reports of official Venezuelan support for terrorists and subversives. In February 2005, an ex-ELN guerrilla told the press that a non-aggression pact existed between the ELN and Venezuelan authorities; he alleged that the Venezuelan National Guard allowed the terrorist group to kidnap ranchers. Separately, the Ecuadorian press, citing Ecuadorian intelligence, has reported that Venezuela has provided training in small arms, intelligence, urban operations, and explosives to radical leftists from Ecuador.” [Venezuela: Terrorism Hub of South America?, Frank Urbancic, U.S. Department of State, 13 de julio de 2006](#)

⁵⁷ “Splinter groups of the FARC and another designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), operated in various parts of Venezuela and were involved in narcotrafficking.” [Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview, U.S. Department of State, 28 de abril de 2006](#)

Puede leerse en mayor detalle acerca del narcotráfico de las FARC via Venezuela en [The Kalashnikov Threat In Venezuela, Sam Logan, International Relations and Security Network Security Watch](#)

⁵⁸ *Terror Close To Home*, Linda Robinson, *US News & World Report*, September 28th 2003

⁵⁹ *Chávez and Iran Unveil Anti-US Fund*, *Al Jazeera*, January 14th 2007

⁶⁰ *Venezuela O El Moscú del Siglo XXI*, Carlos Montaner, July 30th 2006

⁶¹ *Terror Close To Home*, Linda Robinson, *US News & World Report*, September 28th 2003

⁶² *Planea Venezuela Una Compra Récord de Armamentos*, Casto Ocando, *El Nuevo Herald*, October 13th 2006

⁶³ *Chávez Pushes Petro-Diplomacy*, Justin Blum, The Washington Post, November 22nd 2005

⁶⁴ *“The political system that Chávez is trying to force upon Latin America is based on absolute command shielded by a mock democracy (...) However, what’s looming is even worse, because Chávez now demands of his clients that they welcome the Iranian presence. Such a turn is equivalent to playing with fire”*. Caracastán, Jaime Daremblum, La Nación, May 27th 2007

⁶⁵ *Fiery Chávez Aims For A Global Role*, Juan Forero, The Washington Post, September 23rd 2006

⁶⁶ *Piqueteros Argentinos Serán Brigadistas En Venezuela*, Daniel Gallo, La Nación, November 19th 2006

⁶⁷ *Chávez Propuso Crear Un Ejército del MERCOSUR*, Jorge Elías, La Nación, July 6th 2006

⁶⁸ *Fuerte Apoyo de Kirchner A Chávez*, La Nación, November 29th 2006

⁶⁹ *Chávez Está Feliz Por Rechazo de Vázquez A TLC Con EEUU*, Observa, October 12th 2006

⁷⁰ *Chávez Says Venezuela Will Cut Diplomatic Ties With Israel*, Ha’aretz, August 9th 2006



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The Center for Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL), with its main office in Buenos Aires and an office in Montevideo, is a non-profit, non-partisan NGO, created in Argentina on February 26, 2003. It’s founding members and officers who share a Liberal-Democratic vision, have had prior participation in other NGOs as well as in journalistic, Human Rights and academic activities linked with the study of Latin American politics.

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